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On December 2, 2003, the Minister of Education of the Russian Federation, Vladimir 
Filippov, announced that a history textbook currently in use in Russian schools was no 
longer acceptable and should be withdrawn from all classrooms. Just a few days earlier, 
President Putin had told a group of professional historians that "contemporary textbooks 
ought not to become a place for new political and ideological struggle." (1) This high-
level attention to teaching history caught the attention of the general press. It ignited a 
hot debate about the connection between history and politics and about corruption in 
the Ministry’s textbook approval process. The discussion has since escalated into 
broader reflections about the role of history in school and protest against government 
efforts to impose censorship and ideological control.
This is not the first time that history texts have caught the attention of Russian 
politicians. During the election campaign of 1996, both Vladimir Zhirinovsky and 
Gennadi Zyuganov complained that school textbooks were not sufficiently patriotic. In 
April 1998, the Duma education committee, then controlled by the communists, 
persuaded the Duma chairman to send a letter to the Academy of Education 
complaining that history texts contained too much about the dark spots in Soviet history. 
While worrisome, these interventions could be dismissed as the actions of politicians on 
the extremes.
In August 2001 however, Prime Minister Kasianov expressed concern that the 
government had not paid sufficient attention to the teaching of 20th century history and 
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that existing texts provided insufficient support for democracy and the market economy. 
He ordered that textbooks on the 20th Century be rewritten immediately. In contrast to 
his definition of the problem, however, those who developed the criteria for the new 
texts did not mention support for democracy, but invited manuscripts that would foster a 
feeling of patriotism and civic responsibility among students, and provide a single moral, 
patriotic and civic approach. A few months after Kasianov’s statement, veterans’ 
complaints persuaded several regions to withdraw Kreder’s "Modern History of Foreign 
(zarubezhnikh) Countries" from their schools because, they said, it did not properly 
reflect the importance of Soviet Russia in international affairs or the heroism of 
Russians in World War II, and was too sympathetic to policies of western countries. No 
politician or social group, however, has ever complained that school texts did not fully 
discuss the scale, purposes and practices of the GULAG, the mockery of law in the 
Soviet period, or the complicity of the KGB and other government institutions in Stalin’s 
crimes. (2) Those few books published in the mid 1990s that discussed such issues 
tended not to be widely distributed. (3)
The teaching of history provokes controversy in many countries. All governments seek 
to educate their young people with a shared understanding of the past in order to 
promote pride, loyalty and cohesion. In Russia, where values and regimes have been 
changing rapidly, it is not at all surprising that teaching history has become contentious 
and politicized. Authors of twentieth century textbooks face difficult challenges, in part 
because researchers have not yet provided new conceptualizations of the Soviet and 
Post-Soviet periods to guide them. They are well aware also that many of the 
institutions and individuals responsible for the widely condemned repression of the 
Soviet period are still in place. There is a tacit understanding that many historical 
subjects should not be examined too closely.
Yel’tsin’s rueful call for a new national idea reflected his understanding that fresh 
inspiration was needed to legitimize the new Russian government and draw the Russian 
Federation together. A common understanding of a new national idea has failed, thus 
far, to solidify. Actually it is surprising that politicians have paid so little attention to 
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school textbooks of history, despite the fact that a 2001 poll found that 70% of Russians 
draw their knowledge of history from these textbooks. (4)
The text that provoked the recent political intervention is Fatherland (Otechestvennaia) 
History of the 20th Century, for students in the last two years of secondary school. Its 
author, Igor Doliutsky, has updated multiple editions of his book since the early 1990s. 
His books were among the first to introduce accessible language and attention to the 
lives of ordinary citizens into school history texts, as well as to present different, often 
provocative, interpretations of events. His methodology encourages students to analyze 
material, develop arguments, discuss decisions at turning points and consider the role 
of individuals. In his latest, offending, edition, Doliutsky quoted two prominent Russians 
to provoke debate. One stated that Russia had become a police state and the other, 
that developments since Putin’s first election could be called a state coup. Students 
were asked to make arguments for or against the accuracy of these statements. (5)
The education press pounced on this event. Filippov’s decision was first interpreted in 
the context of their immediate concerns, namely as the result of a commercial quarrel 
between publishing houses and as evidence of corruption in the whole system of 
textbook approval. (6)
The Central Ministry of Education in Moscow in fact does operate a complicated system 
for approving school texts that is riddled with corruption. In Soviet times, an expert 
council of the ministry of education approved a single history textbook for each grade. 
This text was translated as necessary, published and distributed to all schools 
throughout the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, the Russian Federation’s Ministry of 
Education decided to introduce variety and competition into the textbook market. It 
sponsored competitions among authors and opened textbook publishing to competition. 
To maintain some quality control, the ministry’s expert commission on textbooks 
developed a system of approvals, or griffes, similar to the system that had existed in 
Soviet times. Sections organized by discipline were charged to read manuscripts and 
decide whether to recommend, permit, or reject books as suitable for general secondary 
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school use. The publishers had to pay a fee in order to have their books considered. 
Insofar as the members of the commissions are poorly paid, lack time to do their work 
carefully, and often have ties to the authors or publishers, the process had invited 
corruption. A series of so-called "textbook murders" in 1998 testifies to the high financial 
stakes attached to getting griffes and publishing contracts. By December 2003, seven 
textbooks had been approved for the 20th century history slot.
According to some accounts, a rival publisher purposely drew Doliutsky’s text to the 
attention of politicians in order to reduce competition, and increase their own profits. 
There is some evidence, but no absolute proof, that this was indeed the case. (7) 
Whatever the reason that this book came to the president’s attention, Putin immediately 
sent a directive to the Academy of Sciences giving them two months to find a solution to 
the problem with history texts. They proposed, and the ministry subsequently approved, 
that there be no more than three approved texts for each grade and that these texts 
should be written by scholars of the Academy, namely themselves. What they did not 
mention, understandably, was that they, as authors, would have limited initial 
competition and established a system designed to provide them with considerable 
authorial rewards.
Discussion about history texts soon spilled over from the education press to multiple 
articles in major newspapers such as Izvestia, Nezavisimya gazeta, and 
Komsomolskaya pravda. It moved beyond narrow but important accusations of 
corruption in the ministry and among publishers, to broader concerns about the role of 
history teaching and growing censorship. The most radical argued that the griffe 
process should be abolished completely, so that teachers and schools could make their 
own choices, as had been promised in the 1992 Education Law. Professional historians 
pointed out that history, particularly recent history, is inevitably connected to politics. 
They argued that it is therefore essential to have contemporary history told from multiple 
points of view. Many addressed the link between patriotism and history teaching, but 
saw no reason why nurturing patriotism required sanitizing history. Not all agreed with 
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Doliutsky’s approach, but all argued that young people needed to know the truth about 
their tragic history. Knowing these historical facts would not reduce their patriotism.
The historians did not mince words. One recalled that the country had already had 
experience with one history book, the History of the Communist Party (b); others 
reflected that three texts were easier to control than many. (8) More generally, educators 
lamented that all the gains of the 1990s, when textbook authors were free to choose 
what to write and teachers to choose what to teach, were now threatened. There had 
been complaints from veterans and politicians and all sorts of other groups throughout 
the 1990s, they recalled, but only now had high-level politicians intervened. They 
accused the government of trying to impose censorship and ideological control. 
Suddenly educators found the large public forum they had sought throughout the 1990s, 
but ironically not to make a case for basic reform and financial support as they had 
wished, but to protest a reversal of what they had already achieved. The general press 
was interested in their case because it offered such a glaring example of the gathering 
trend toward authoritarianism and censorship that now worries many Russians. (9)
National and regional histories
This recent debate about history teaching has not yet addressed the situation in the 
Federation’s regions where there are large non-Slavic ethnic populations. 
Developments suggest that the central government will face a huge challenge if it tries 
to reassert central control of the history curriculum. In the early 1990s, when financial 
and curricular responsibilities were radically decentralized, the central ministry and the 
regions worked out a formula whereby 60% of the curriculum became the so-called 
federal component, 30% the regional component, and 10% the responsibility of 
individual schools. It was agreed that regional history would be taught as part of this 
regional component. Regions began to award the griffe for approved texts. That division 
of curricular responsibility has served to justify the fact that Russian history texts, the 
federal component text, rarely include significant information about peoples of the 
federation other than Russians. The Russian Academy of Education, recognizing this as 
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a problem, in the mid 1990s encouraged the development of a text for an experimental 
course on the history of the peoples of the Russian Federation. Yet it, too, told the story 
of minority peoples entirely from the Russian point of view, Tatars, Bashkirs or Yakuts 
appearing when they came under Russian sway. (10) Its authors depended heavily on 
Marxist formulations, invariably arguing that incorporation into the Russian empire 
represented a progressive step in these peoples’ development. This integrative effort 
was not pursued, so that there is currently no school text that presents the history of all 
the Russian Federation’s peoples in a single narrative.
Regional historians set out to fill the gap. Local historians proceeded cautiously, 
beginning to publish texts in the middle 1990s. A text for grades 8-9 in Bashkortostan, 
for example, traces the roots of the Bashkir people back to the stone age, noting that in 
the 18th century, agreements with Russia were systematically broken by the Tsarist 
government. The authors challenge the Russian view that the Bashkirs needed to be 
"pacified" later in the 19th century, detail Bashkir suffering under imperialistic Russian 
rule and criticize the militarization of their economy. (11)
Tatarstan presents a particularly complicated situation, as two different versions of 
history compete for recognition, both of which might prove troubling to politicians now 
trying to centralize power in Moscow. Regional authorities have approved one text with 
an interesting introduction for the students that discusses how histories of Russia 
traditionally mention little about other nationalities, and offer only negative information 
about the Tatars. The authors tell the students about a CPSU decree in 1944 that made 
it impossible to do research on the history of the Golden Horde and the Tatar khanates. 
The text itself traces Tatar origins to the Golden Horde, emphasizing its great power, 
empire, military resistance to Russian rule and the subsequent scattering of large 
numbers of Tatars throughout what is today the Russian Federation. It also emphasizes 
Tatar cultural affinities with the Turks. (12) There is a competing version of the Tatar past 
that emphasizes its origins in the Bulghar Khanate. This text lays the case for Tatarstan 
sovereignty by portraying a continuous cultural presence in Tatarstan since ancient 
times. (13)
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The peoples of the north Caucausus are also selecting and presenting histories of past 
glory that present Russians as invaders and exploiters, and often provide historical 
justification for claiming land that currently belongs to culturally distinct neighbors. (14) 
The principle that regions have the right to present local history was firmly established in 
Soviet times, and confirmed in the context of Yel’tsin’s radical decentralization. What 
changed was that the central ministry of education lost control over the content of 
regional history. These new history textbooks are among the predictable but unintended 
consequences of this policy. One scholar sensitive to the power of national myths has 
raised an alarm, but this issue appears not yet to have received attention from the Putin 
government. (15) Cultural nationalism is growing, at least in Tatarstan. The regional 
government has proposed the use of the Roman alphabet for the Tatar language, as 
was the case in the 1920s, despite RF constitutional requirements that all nationalities 
use cyrillic. Central and regional governments would appear to be on a collision course, 
and the Tatar government has vowed to take the case to the Strasbourg international 
court if necessary. (16) Despite nationalistic mythmaking in the regions, the current 
debate about history teaching has not touched on this issue. (17)
Modernization and Quality Control in the Russian Educational System
The controversy over teaching history is taking place in a changing educational 
environment. The ministry of education recently has introduced two broad policy 
initiatives; both mark efforts to bring Russian educational policies more into line with 
international practice. The first, the "Strategy of Modernization," is designed to redirect 
the goal of secondary school education from the inculcation of knowledge as such to the 
development of "competence." The ministry defines competence as the ability to find, 
analyze and use knowledge, solve problems and adapt to changing circumstances in 
the real world. (18) The Russians’ sense of urgency is increased by the findings of the 
OECD Program for International Assessment (PISA). In 2000, the PISA tests were 
administered to 15-year old students in 31 countries to evaluate their higher thinking 
skills, such as their ability to apply what they knew in new situations and to solve 
problems. The Russians, who had scored well in previous large comparative 
7
international tests of factual knowledge, were shocked to discover that their students 
placed 27th in reading literacy, 26th in scientific literacy and 22nd in mathematical 
literacy. (19) These findings and the ministry’s response to them adds irony to the 
current dispute over history teaching, insofar as Doliutsky’s text is one of the few set up 
to develop the critical thinking skills given priority by the new modernization policy.
The second initiative with wide implications for the entire school system is the phased 
introduction of the so-called single state exam (edinii gosudarstvenii eksamen). It is 
designed to maintain quality and standards throughout the federation and to reduce 
corruption in the entrance application process to higher level educational institutions. 
The test is an obligatory written standard exam, to be taken in core subjects including 
history, by all secondary school students in their final year. It will serve simultaneously 
as a graduation exam and as an entrance exam. The ministry is also developing 
educational standards to be put into place in 2006, though they are, surprisingly, not yet 
coordinated with the new federal exam. The exams are facing opposition from varied 
sources: Innovative educators fear it will reward memorization and conservative 
teaching styles; universities and institutes resist losing total control over their 
admissions, and with it the many lucrative advantages of the present system; some 
characterize the exam as an indirect means of reinstating central control of the 
curriculum. In the Russian context, however, educators have made a convincing case 
that this is a progressive step. OECD reports and the World Bank have long urged the 
introduction of such an exam to solve systemic problems of corruption in higher school 
admissions and increase equity of access. (20)
Whether restoring central control is a primary aim of introducing the exam or not, it will 
certainly have that effect. The Soviet government controlled the curriculum by means of 
inputs, in the sense that the content of the single text and the comments of teachers 
were carefully scripted by the central ministry of education. Now the curriculum is to be 
shaped in the internationally—accepted way, by testing outputs, what students have 
learned. It is widely agreed that teachers will teach to the test; they want their pupils to 
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do well. These tests will in fact drive the curriculum. Because of the Soviet heritage of 
control, educators are understandably sensitive to this aspect of the exam.
Reports that some designers of the history tests seek to eliminate questions about the 
dark spots in Soviet history concerns those who believe students should learn the truth. 
If there are no questions about the ugly side of the Soviet past, teachers are unlikely to 
teach about them. Alexander Danilov, a historian and textbook author who has served 
on the ministry’s expert commission, observed that not one textbook published in 2003 
discussed the repression of the Soviet era fully, nor the responsibility of those in power 
for what took place. (21) He laments that there has been a quiet shutdown of the 
pluralism and freedom of ideas and opinions of the 1990s. The withdrawal of approval 
from Doliutsky’s text confirms that isolated incidents involving history texts were not 
isolated after all, but form a pattern of increasing censorship.
Conclusions
Russia’s educators find themselves caught in a difficult situation. The ministry is 
pursuing its obligation to create a coherent educational system throughout the 
federation that will support a sense of belonging to a single country and offer equity of 
access to education of high quality. The single state exam is one effort to move toward 
this goal, one that is proving difficult to implement fairly and without corruption. The 
ministry is also expected to provide support for the government’s ten-year plan that 
identifies the creation of human capital as a top priority. (22) Educators are charged to 
develop an able, competent, educated workforce. They recognize that these 
competencies can be developed only by offering students practice and experience in 
finding and analyzing data, identifying and solving problems, making decisions and 
defending their points of view, that is, precisely by using the methodology that the 
Doliutsky text exemplifies. The strategies of modernization and the introduction of a 
universally obligatory single state exam already exist in potential tension with one 
another.
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Political directives about what is and is not acceptable history have added a further 
layer of complexity to this already difficult situation, casting educational policies in a new 
light. Political orthodoxy can exist only at the cost of reduced stimulation for students to 
think for themselves and attain a sophisticated understanding of real social processes. 
On the other hand, there are numerous positive roles for central exams, for example, to 
motivate textbook writers and teachers to include the experience of ethnic minorities in 
federal textbooks. An educational case can be made for either side. It is the political 
uses of the tests that will determine their ultimate value.
The Putin administration’s decision to ban a history textbook revealed its authoritarian 
instincts and lack of confidence in the free exchange of ideas. It provided a focus for 
what many already knew, that growing political interference and censorship in education 
parallels a similar trend in other spheres of Russia life. The politicians’ recent concerns 
about history teaching focus on their own legitimacy in the short term. Putin’s 
government has shown no interest in aspects ofhistory teaching that have dangerous 
implications for the cohesion of the federation itself. Students in several ethnically-
based regions are being taught nationalistic myths about a glorious past that was cut 
short by Russian conquest. They are being brought up to resent Russia’s control in the 
past and, by inclination, to seek more autonomy or even independence in the future. 
Russian students, for their part, study a history that tells them little or nothing about 
these peoples. No one is taught to think of Russia as a multicultural federation, nor to 
value the legitimacy of different points of view on a common experience. (23) The 
creation of a version of Russia’s history that could accomplish this goal is an enormous 
challenge for serious academic historians. Yet, despite the warning of Chechnya, 
neither historians, textbook writers nor politicians have focused on this problem. The 
Soviet legacy of separate schools for minorities has combined with Yel’tsin’s policy of 
decentralizing control of the curriculum from Moscow to the regional capitals, to create a 
potential political problem that is not being addressed. History teaching and politics 
continue their tortuous relationship in Russia. Despite recent changes in leadership at 
the Ministry of Education, it is unlikely educators will go where politicians fear to tread. 
No matter how clearly Russian educators may understand the need to modernize their 
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educational system and to teach young people to think for themselves about actual 
social problems and Russia’s tragic past, they have been crudely reminded that political 
concerns will take priority.
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